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the ownership of the gristmill lots. The court reasoned that when the
gristmill owner relinquished his one-half interest in the sawmill
property back to the original owner, he merged that land under a
single owner. Any flowage right to the dam that might have existed
with the gristmill property ended with that merger.
Joseph A. Dawson

MARYLAND
A. H. Smith Assoc. Ltd. Part. v. Maryland Dept. of the Env't, 695 A.2d
1252 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (affirming the imposition of civil fines
for violation of consent order and wastewater discharge).
A.H. Smith Associates Limited Partnership ("Smith"), owned and
operated a sand and gravel processing facility. The facility operated by
Smith required a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit for discharges of wastewater. The Maryland
Department of the Environment ("MDE") administered the NPDES
for the state of Maryland as authorized by the Environmental
Protection Agency. In March 1991, prior to the issuance of a permit,
MDE and Smith entered into a consent order allowing for the
discharge of wastewater. Both the consent order and NPDES permit
authorized the discharge of wastewater, consisting of sand and gravel,
wash water, and stormwater runoff. This discharge was subject to a
daily maximum and a monthly average maximum effluent limitation
for total suspended solids ("TSS"), and an effluent limitation on
turbidity with a daily maximum and a monthly average limit. MDE
monitored these limits once per week utilizing a grab sample. A grab
sample consists of a container filled directly from the outflow of the
source at a given point in time. During the period of the consent
order and later after issuance of the permit, MDE personnel found
numerous violations of the daily and monthly effluent limitations for
either TSS, turbidity, or both.
MDE filed suit in the circuit court for Prince George's County
seeking $297,000 in civil penalties and an injunction against further
violations of the permit. The court imposed $49,000 in fines against
Smith, but refused to issue an injunction. Smith appealed alleging:
the trial court abused its discretion in construing the consent order
and permit language in favor of MDE, thereby improperly imposing
liability; the trial court erred in concluding that the Appellant violated
both the consent order and the permit; and the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding $1,000 per violation despite clear and
uncontroverted mitigating factors in favor of MDE. Finding no error
on the part of the trial court, the appellate court affirmed.
Smith's appeal contended the state's sampling methods did not
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comply with the language of the consent order and Discharge Permit
and that a grab sample is not "any given sample representing 24-hours
flow" and, thus, is insufficient to be the basis for a finding that Smith
exceeded the effluent limitations in the consent order and permit.
The court rejected Smith's theory, noting .... "MDE would be
required to obtain an unspecified number of samples over a twentyfour hour period and then average the results obtained... this is not
what is called for under the applicable terms of the [c] onsent [o] rder
and permit." The court reasoned that under EN § 9-331(4), MDE may
require a permit holder "[t]o sample discharges in accordance with
the methods, at the locations, at the intervals, and in the manner
[MDE] requires." The MDE imposed grab samples as a requirement
upon Smith under both the consent order and permit. Smith could
only obtain the permit if it accepted those conditions, which it did.
Additionally, the court held that under the consent order, Smith
contractually agreed that grab samples would determine violations. As
to the amount of the penalty for each violation, the court found Smith
agreed to accept liability of $1,000 for each violation waiving any right
to contest the amount of the penalty. The court found no abuse of
discretion by the trial court's refusal to release Smith from its bargain.
As to permit violations, the trial court was entitled to impose fines up
to $360,000. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's consideration of three factors: (1) the amount of the penalty to
which Appellant had agreed in the consent order; (2) the factors
applicable to the imposition of fines in administrative adjudications as
set forth in EN § 9-342(b); and (3) the court's decision that it would
not impose more than one fine per day regardless of the number of
permit terms contravened on that day. The court rejected Smith's
argument that foreign courts have faced more egregious cases and
imposed lesser fines on a percentage basis.
James Fosnaught

MICHIGAN
K & K Constr., Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 575 N.W. 2d
531 (Mich. 1998) (holding that a trial court must use a balancing test
to determine whether a denial by the Department of Natural
Resources for permit to fill wetlands constitutes a categorical taking,
and must consider the property as a whole in its analysis).
J.F.K Resort Company ('JFK") owned eighty-two contiguous acres
of property divided into four parcels. Some of the parcels contained
wetlands. JFK had previously developed one of the parcels. The
remaining three undeveloped parcels were at issue in this case. K & K
Construction Company ("K & K"), as general contractor, and J.F.K., as

